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I. INTRODUCTION
When is a civil remedy available to a person injured through a
violation of the Minnesota Constitution? The answer must be
found in a small and often contradictory body of Minnesota case
law. To date, the great majority of cases that have involved the
Minnesota Constitution arose when litigants raised the Minne-
sota Constitution as a "shield"-that is, as a device to thwart the
t The author is a partner in the Minneapolis law firm of Greene Espel. B.A.
University of Iowa, 1983; J.D. University of Michigan, 1986. He wishes to thank his
colleagues at Greene Espel and his former colleagues at Popham Haik Schnobrich and
Kaufman Ltd. for their encouragement of continued scholarship and teaching by their
members.
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enforcement of a state or local statute, ordinance, or regula-
tion.1 For this reason, the Minnesota Supreme Court and Min-
nesota Court of Appeals have rarely addressed the circumstances
in which private plaintiffs can use their rights granted under the
Minnesota Constitution "as a sword"-that is, as an independent
basis for seeking compensation, an injunction, or other relief.
While Minnesota appellate courts have taken for granted the
availability of a private right of action to enforce the Minnesota
Constitution, those courts have never articulated why such a
cause of action is available. Without the foundation of a clear
underlying philosophy, the logical limits of such a cause of ac-
tion must remain uncertain. And until those limits are better
defined, the availability of a private right of action to assert every
state constitutional right remains in doubt.
2
Even where a cause of action exists, immunities or defenses
can preclude or limit the availability of relief. Minnesota courts
have compounded the predicament of the "sword-wielder" by
failing to adopt a consistent approach to the definition of the
immunities available to governmental entities and their officials
for liability arising from violations of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion. Instead, every time the Minnesota Supreme Court has
faced the question, it has resolved it as if faced with a question of
first impression, and in each case has adopted a different
approach.3
When the Minnesota Supreme Court most recently ap-
proached the issue, the result accorded little or no weight to the
value of protecting governments from liability in cases involving
the exercise of discretion or novel constitutional theories.'
Meanwhile, the Minnesota Court of Appeals staked out a posi-
tion near the other extreme and resurrected the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity to protect the State of Minnesota from liability
1. See State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990) (applying the freedom of
conscience clause invoked by respondent in administrative proceeding under Minne-
sota Human Rights Act); State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1988) (finding a
right to 12-person jury in misdemeanor cases in criminal proceeding); see also Kleeman
v. Cadwell, 414 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (challenging enforcement of
Tort Reform Act provision by invoking Due Process Clause of art. I, § 7).
2. See infra part II.
3. See infra part III.
4. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1991) (reversing
the court of appeals holding that the "taking" of private property was noncompensable
under the doctrine of public necessity).
[Vol. 20
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for damages due to state constitutional violations.5 Nevertheless,
despite the absence of either definition or direction, the use of
the Minnesota Constitution to assert a private cause of action
remains a viable, workable option.
II. Is A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO ENFORCE A
MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?
The opening step in any serious evaluation of remedies for
violations of the United States Constitution must begin with the
United States Supreme Court's rediscovery of 42 U.S.C. § 19836
in Monroe v. Pape.7 Section 1983 provides a statutory private
cause of action that allows a plaintiff to seek damages and other
relief for violations of the United States Constitution and certain
federal statutory rights.8 Minnesota, however, has never adopted
its own equivalent of § 1983 to remedy violations of its own con-
stitution. Unless § 1983 was unnecessary for the assertion of a
private cause of action under the U.S. Constitution in the first
place, one might wonder whether the Minnesota Legislature's
failure to act leaves victims of state constitutional violations with-
out a civil remedy. Without addressing either the necessity, if
any, of a state legislative equivalent or the doctrinal foundation,
5. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 903 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd on other
grounds, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1993) (providing that a party who deprives another of rights
or privileges secured by the Constitution and other laws shall be liable to the injured
party in law and in equity).
7. 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). Section 1983 is the revised version of § I of the Ku
Klux Act of 1871, which itself was derived in part from language in § 2 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. It provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). In the words of the United States Supreme Court,
"Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal
remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured
by the Constitution and laws of the Nation .... " Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239
(1972).
Some of the actionable federal statutory rights include the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988); the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988); and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
1994]
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if any, for recognizing a private right of action,9 the Minnesota
Supreme Court and Minnesota Court of Appeals have assumed
that plaintiffs may bring a private action to enforce the Minne-
sota Constitution. 10
Should the Minnesota courts ever feel compelled to seek out a
rationale for recognizing a private cause of action by judicial fiat,
decisions of other states readily provide them with various ratio-
nales. In other states, appellate courts considering the issue
have generally recognized a private cause of action to enforce
state constitutional rights. However, the rationales given for the
recognition of a private right of action in this context suggest
that not every state constitutional provision will be enforced in
this manner.
A. Minnesota Law: The Unexplained Presumption that Civil
Remedies Must Exist
1. A Foregone Conclusion
One of the first efforts to use the Minnesota Constitution as a
sword involved a case that, in the Minnesota Supreme Court's
words, "reads like a sequel to Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath."t"
Those facts alone may explain why the supreme court did not
9. The approach of the Minnesota courts contrasts sharply with the approach of
the United States Supreme Court's detailed vision of § 1983. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971)
(explaining in detail the basis for implying limited cause of action against federal offi-
cials for violations of Federal Constitution).
10. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 302-03 (Minn. 1993) (rejecting lawsuit by
school districts with low property-tax bases alleging that state school financing formula
violates Education Clauses and Equal Protection guarantees of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion); Knudtson v. City of Coates, 506 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), review
granted (Oct. 28, 1993), reh'g denied, No. C2-92-2533, 1994 WL 314620 (Minn. June 30,
1994) (enjoining prohibition on non-obscene nude dancing under free expression pro-
vision to Minnesota Constitution); Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 904-05 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993) (striking down
welfare statute disfavoring new Minnesotans under Equal Protection guarantees of the
Federal and Minnesota Constitutions); McGovern v. City of Minneapolis, 480 N.W.2d
121, 126-27 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), review denied (Feb. 27, 1992) (permitting owners of
houses damaged in police actions to obtain compensation from the City of Minneapolis
under the state constitution takings clause); Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479
N.W.2d 38, 41-42 (Minn. 1991), reh'gdenied (Jan. 27, 1992) (holding that municipality is
not insulated from liability to homeowners under doctrine of public necessity); see also
Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 233-34, 14 N.W.2d 400, 409 (1944)
(permitting hybrid tort/constitutional lawsuit against officials but not town).
11. Thiede, 217 Minn. at 219, 14 N.W.2d at 402 (referring to JOHN STEINBECK, THE
GRAPES OF WRATH, (1939)).
[Vol. 20
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engage in an extended analysis of whether the Minnesota Consti-
tution could be enforced in a civil action. The plaintiffs in
Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley12 were forcibly removed from
their home in sub-zero weather by town officials who sought to
relieve the town's burden of supporting the family.13 Although
the removal was authorized by state law, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the eviction violated the plaintiffs' right under
the Minnesota Constitution not to be forcibly removed while oc-
cupying their own freehold.14 The court then held the individ-
ual officials personally liable.' 5
The Thiede decision did not usher in a new era in state consti-
tutional litigation in Minnesota. Indeed, in later decisions the
Minnesota Supreme Court has cited only to its interpretation of
the Constitution and paid no attention to the analysis of the civil
remedies available for state constitutional violations.16 The deci-
sion's ignominy may be due to the uncertain basis for its hold-
ing. Because the Thiede plaintiffs were victims of both a
constitutional violation and the intentional torts of trespass and
assault, for which a civil remedy was available as a matter of com-
mon law, 7 the case did not squarely present the question of
whether damages are available solely for state constitutional viola-
tions. The decision does not make clear whether damages
would have been available in the absence of any tort.
Nearly one half-century later, the Minnesota Supreme Court
again upheld an award for a violation of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion. In Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 8 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court permitted the owner of a home damaged in
a police raid to obtain compensation for a taking of property
without just compensation.' 9 The property owner did not rely
12. 217 Minn. 218, 14 N.W.2d 400 (1944).
13. Id. at 220-24, 14 N.W.2d at 403-05.
14. Id. at 224-26, 14 N.W.2d at 405-06.
15. Id. at 230-34, 14 N.W.2d at 407-09.
16. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1991) (citing Theide for
existence of "unenumerated" state constitutional rights); State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107,
111 (Minn. 1987) (citing Theide for definition of fundamental rights); Erickson v. Sun-
set Memorial Park Ass'n, 259 Minn. 532, 545-46, 108 N.W.2d 434, 442 (1961) (citing
Theide for analysis of rights and privileges secured under MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 2).
17. Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 231, 14 N.W.2d 400, 408
(1944) ("The alleged misconduct of the individual defendants in the instant case con-
stituted a trespass upon plaintiff's property and an assault upon her person, for both of
which the law furnishes a remedy.").
18. 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
19. Id. at 41.
1994]
5
Baker: The Minnesota Constitution as a Sword: The Evolving Private Cause
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
upon the federal takings clause or Minnesota's inverse condem-
nation statute, 20 but instead based his claim solely upon what the
Minnesota Supreme Court characterized as the plain meaning of
the language of Article I, Section 13 of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion, which requires compensation when property is damaged
for a public use.21 Without pausing to explain the basis for a
private cause of action to enforce this right, the supreme court
simply held that "[o] nce a 'taking' is found, compensation is re-
quired by operation of law."22 The court chose not to apply the
tort defense of public necessity based upon "basic notions of fair-
ness and justice . . . [that make it unfair] to allocate the entire
risk of loss to an innocent homeowner for the good of the
public. 123
Five weeks after the Wegner decision, in McGovern v. City of Min-
neapolis,24 the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of
summary judgment in favor of the City of Minneapolis on a very
similar case that involved damage inflicted during a crack-co-
caine house raid.25 The court of appeals, however, seized upon
the supreme court's use of the term "innocent" in a characteriza-
tion of the plaintiffs in Wegner and remanded the case for a de-
termination of whether the plaintiffs were involved in criminal
activity.
2 6
Significant for these purposes, the Minnesota Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals treated the availability of a private cause of
20. MINN. STAT. § 117.016 (1992).
21. Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 40.
22. Id. at 42.
23. Id.
24. 480 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
25. Id. at 127.
26. Id. This apparent recognition of a "guilty plaintiff" defense has no parallel in
federal constitutional analysis. Justice Frankfurter once noted that "[iut is a fair sum-
mary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in
controversies involving not very nice people." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
When asked to recognize a "contributory fault" defense to § 1983 liability, the
Eighth Circuit declined. Wycoff v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 1260, 1267 (8th Cir. 1978). In
Wycoff the court stated:
It must be realized, however, that prison administrators are required to deal in
a constitutional manner with convicts who are violent and unruly as well as
with those whose conduct is exemplary or at least peaceful. And while prison
officials must have some latitude in imposing conditions reasonably necessary
to control a prisoner's behavior, the contributory fault of an inmate does not
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action in Wegner and McGovern as a foregone conclusion. Argua-
bly, that approach may relate only to the particular constitu-
tional rights invoked by the plaintiffs in those cases. After all,
what court could find a taking without just compensation while
holding that additional legislation is necessary to permit the
plaintiff to actually receive compensation once a taking has oc-
curred?2 7 However, while the Wegner and McGovern decisions do
not necessarily support the existence of a private cause of action
to enforce each "right" in the Minnesota Bill of Rights, let alone
to enforce the provisions of all remaining articles, they do offer
support to the proposition that some private cause of action
must exist under the Minnesota Constitution.
2. Re-visiting the Issue
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently re-visited the issue
in an action challenging the constitutionality of an added restric-
tion on the availability of welfare benefits to new Minnesotans. 8
Like the defendants in the Thiede case decades before, 9 the
Commissioner of the Department of Human Services was
charged with carrying out an effort to reduce the financial bur-
den of welfare assistance, this time by limiting the benefits avail-
able to new Minnesotans without minor children to a fraction of
the benefits available to those who have resided in Minnesota
more than six months.3 0 In Mitchell v. Steffen 3' a class of new
Minnesotans successfully attacked the relevant statute at the dis-
trict court level, persuading the court that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.3 1 On ap-
peal, the plaintiffs sought to protect their victory from potential
scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court, and for that rea-
27. A right to some kind of compensation is implicit in the takings clause itself,
which cannot be said for other constitutional rights. For example, the right to free
expression in the Minnesota Constitution does not necessarily imply that damages
should be available to those whose right to free expression has been infringed.
28. Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd on other
grounds, 540 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993).
29. Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 14 N.W.2d 400 (1944).
30. The Commissioner's actions were authorized by MINN. STAT. § 256D.065
(1992). Mitchel4 487 N.W.2d at 899.
31. 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 504 N.W.2d 198
(Minn. 1993).
32. Id. at 902-04.
19941
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son requested the Minnesota Court of Appeals to invalidate the
statute under both the Federal and Minnesota Constitutions.
33
Relying upon a cryptic sentence in a 1985 decision, 4 the
Commissioner contended that no cause of action for damages
was available for violations of the Minnesota Constitution. Once
again, the court seemed to assume that the availability of a pri-
vate cause of action to enforce the Minnesota Constitution was
unquestioned (while limiting the availability of damages).5 On
review, the Minnesota Supreme Court, affirming the lower
courts, held that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution. 6 Unlike the court of appeals,
however, the supreme court expressly chose not to consider the
state constitutional question. 7
A recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision involving the use
of the Minnesota Constitution as a sword, Skeen v. State, is also
the most famous.3 1 In 1988, fifty-two school districts and ten par-
ents sued the State of Minnesota, one of its agencies and com-
missioners, alleging that the school financing system violated the
Education Clause and the Equal Protection guarantees of the
Minnesota Constitution.3 9  Following a seventy-six day bench
trial, Wright County District Judge Gary Meyer declared that
three components of the education finance system violated the
Education Clause and the Equal Protection guarantees.40 The
33. Id. at 904.
34. The Commissioner in Mitchell challenged the availability of a private cause of
action under the Minnesota Constitution in reliance on the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals' statement in Bird v. State, 375 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) that the
Minnesota Supreme Court "has not as yet recognized" a tort for deprivation of due
process. Mitchell 487 N.W.2d at 905. This language, however, appeared in Bird as part
of the court of appeals' analysis of whether a plaintiff could seek damages because a
state department had failed to comply with statutory provisions imposing a duty to pro-
vide the plaintiffs with notice and a hearing prior to canceling their automobile dealer's
license. Bird, 375 N.W.2d at 40 (relying on MINN. STAT. § 168.27, subd. 13 (1984)).
The court was merely considering whether the statute, by itself, created "a cause of
action in tort," and does not appear to have addressed a separate question of whether
the same conduct was actionable as a violation of the Minnesota Constitution. Id.
35. Mitchell 487 N.W.2d at 900; see also infra notes 69-138 and accompanying text.
36. Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d at 203.
37. Id. In her dissent, Justice Tomljanovich reached the state constitutional ques-
tion, and concluded that the statute did not violate the equal protection guarantee of
either the state or the Federal Constitution. Nonetheless, she too, appears to have as-
sumed the availability of private cause of action to raise that issue. Id. at 210-11
(Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).
38. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
39. Id. at 301.
40. Id. at 301-02.
[Vol. 20
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State, along with several intervenors,41 appealed separately to the
court of appeals.42 The court of appeals consolidated the appeal
and certified the matter to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
43
The availability of a private cause of action to invoke the Min-
nesota Constitution was only one of several troubling procedural
issues raised by the Skeen lawsuit." Despite the obvious occasion
for resolution of the private cause of action issue, the supreme
court went directly to the merits of the claims and reversed each
portion of the district court's holding.45 Once again, an oppor-
tunity to articulate the theoretical basis for private enforcement
of the Minnesota Constitution passed without comment.
B. Alternative Rationales from Other States
While other state courts have concluded that a private cause of
action is available to enforce their states' constitutions, their ba-
ses are diverse. Should the Minnesota Supreme Court ever elect
to articulate a rationale for such a cause of action, they will likely
borrow from one or more of these approaches. However, there
are inherent limitations in each of these approaches that affect
the full scope of the private cause of action. By examining those
approaches, one can speculate about the limits the supreme
court might place on the use of the Minnesota Constitution as a
sword.
41. By this point in the litigation, the State had been joined by a substantial
number of school districts that had intervened to protect a system that favored them.
Id. at 302.
42. Id. at 302.
43. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 302.
44. Id. at 306. In their Complaint, the plaintiffs did not ask the court for relief that
would directly remedy any injury. Id. at 299-300. Instead, through an injunction against
the revenue-raising devices that wealthier school districts used to exacerbate the dispari-
ties and an injunction to compel the Commissioner to recommend new legislation that
would close the gaps, they sought to create an equality of misery. Id. at 306. If the
district court or Minnesota Supreme Court had applied the same doctrines of jus-
ticiability and redress applicable to civil actions in federal courts, the case likely would
have been dismissed. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
38-40 (1976) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit based on their special
interest in the health problems of the poor); NAACP v. Harris, 607 F.2d 514, 520 (1st
Cir. 1979) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to contest alleged inequalities in pub-
lic financing where success would merely achieve "the equality of equal misery").
45. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 319-20.
19941
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1. The "Self-Executing" Rights Doctrine
Courts in some states have held that most, but not necessarily
all, state constitutional rights are "self-executing" and, for that
reason, those rights can be enforced in a private action in the
absence of a legislated remedial scheme.46 The presumption of
a self-executing constitutional provision can be overcome only if
a contrary intent is shown.47 Despite this presumption, the
"tests" for self-executing provisions are frequently difficult to ap-
ply and are somewhat circular.
48
A more meaningful test is whether the provision "merely indi-
cates principles, without laying down rules by means of which
those principles may be given the force of law."49 For example, a
section of the "Victim's Bill of Rights" in the California Constitu-
tion entitled the "right to safe schools" was not a self-executing
provision because "[i]t imposes no express duty on anyone to
make schools safe [and is] wholly devoid of guidelines, mecha-
nisms, or procedures from which a damages remedy could be
inferred."50
2. English Common Law
Other states have grounded the right to sue for constitutional
violations in the common law of England. For example, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland has recognized such a cause of
action because "[u] nder the common law of England, where indi-
vidual rights, such as those now protected by Article 26 [of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights] were preserved by a fundamen-
tal document (e.g., the Magna Carta), a violation of those rights
46. See, e.g., White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975) (indicating that the Cali-
fornia constitutional right to privacy is self-executing and supports a cause of action for
an injunction); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 408 So. 2d
711, 714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 432 So. 2d 567,568 (Fla. 1983) (ruling that the
ban on discrimination "because of race, religion or physical handicap" in the Florida
Constitution is self-executing).
47. See, e.g., Winchester v. Howard, 64 P. 692, 693 (Cal. 1901); Leger v. Stockton
Unified Sch. Dist., 249 Cal. Rptr. 688, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
48. See, e.g., Leger 249 Cal. Rptr. at 691 (holding that a provision "is self-executing if
no legislation is necessary to give effect to it, and if there is nothing to be done by the
Legislature to put it into operation").
49. Id. (quoting Older v. Superior Court, 109 P. 478, 482 (Cal. 1910)).
50. Id. at 691.
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generally could be remedied by a traditional action for
damages."
5 1
Grounding the remedy in the common law implies that the
legislature might provide a "reasonable substitute" for the rem-
edy through legislation, as it has been permitted to do for other
areas of the common law, without violating Article I, Section 8 of
the Minnesota Constitution.5 2 In addition, a common law ra-
tionale for the cause of action may require the courts to recog-
nize common-law defenses-such as official and sovereign
immunity.
3. Restatement (Second) of Toits § 874A
Professor Jennifer Friesen and at least one court have relied
upon Section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as a
source of definition for a private cause of action in constitutional
violations.53 That section provides that:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by pro-
scribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a
civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines
that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose
of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of
the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a
right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new
cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.5 4
A new cause of action would not be available under Section
874A to enforce a constitutional provision that does not protect
an identifiable class of persons, or does not proscribe or require
certain conduct, or if the court does not conclude that the pri-
vate right of action is appropriate and "needed to assure the ef-
fectiveness of the provision."55  However, plaintiffs may be
relegated to a suitable existing tort action that may be subject to
51. Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921, 924 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1984).
52. See Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 1986).
53. JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, 1 7.05[3] (1993); see atsoJones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d
891, 893-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (citing § 874A for the proposition that "the Texas
Constitution constitutes an independent legal basis for a cause of action claiming an
infringement of the right of free speech").
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defenses such as comparative fault, consent, privilege, or other
tort law constraints.
56
4. An Analogy to Bivens
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Nar-
cotics,57 the United States Supreme Court implied a cause of ac-
tion to seek damages for Fourth Amendment violations by
federal agents from the United States Constitution and the statu-
tory jurisdiction of the federal courts.58 This cause of action,
known as a "Bivens claim,"59 has been expanded beyond the
Fourth Amendment to other constitutional rights.6" However,
the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions where there are
"special factors counseling hesitation" or where Congress has
created an alternative remedial scheme available to the
plaintiff.61
State courts are using the Bivens holding and its exceptions to
define and shape private causes of action under their state con-
stitutions. For example, courts in New Jersey62 and Massachu-
setts63 have relied on Bivens to explain their recognition of an
implied cause of action for state constitutional violations. Simi-
larly, courts in Alaska6 4 and Hawaii65 have invoked the excep-
tions of the Bivens doctrine to deny relief. As with the remedy in
Bivens, the claim may be subject to challenge based upon a po-
tentially open-ended set of "special factors counseling hesita-
tion" and is susceptible to state legislation restricting the amount
and opportunity for relief.66
56. FRIESEN, supra note 54, at 7.05[3].
57. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
58. Id. at 395-96.
59. FRIESEN, supra note 54, at 7.05[2].
60. Id. at 17.03[3].
61. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 367 (1983).
62. See Strauss v. State, 330 A.2d 646, 650 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (conclud-
ing that the plaintiff's constitutional right to due process is within the exception to the
statutory bar).
63. See Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program Inc., 459 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Mass. 1983) (stat-
ing that a person may be entitled to judicial relief even in the absence of a statutory
provision).
64. See King v. Alaska State Hous. Auth., 633 P.2d 256, 260-61 (Alaska 1981) (deny-
ing damage relief because of "special factors counseling hesitation").
65. -See Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198, 1205-06 (Haw. 1979) (arguing by analogy
to Bivens and permitting relief against individual officers, but not the sovereign entity).
66. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1983).
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III. IMMUNITIES TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
The primary battleground in federal constitutional litigation is
not the availability of a remedy, but the scope and nature of de-
fenses available to defendants sued under Bivens or § 1983.67 In-
deed, many plaintiffs assert state constitutional claims in order to
circumvent defenses otherwise available to the defendants under
§ 1983 or state tort law.68 Similarly, litigation concerning state
tort remedies against governments and their officials commonly
turns on the scope of immunities, privileges, and other defenses
designed to restrict or bar relief in certain cases.69 There is every
reason to believe that immunities will play an equally important
role in state constitutional litigation in Minnesota.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed the immunities
available to defendants sued in state constitutional lawsuits on
three occasions: in 1944 through the Thiede case;7 ° in 1988
through the landmark decision in Jarvis v. Levine7 and most re-
cently in 1991 through the Wegner case.72 The following year,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the State's immunity
in Mitchell v. Steffen.73 In the course of its three decisions, the
Minnesota Supreme Court performed a 180-degree turn, shift-
ing from absolute individual liability and governmental immu-
nity,7 4 to a form of qualified individual immunity,75 to absolute
67. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987).
68. See, e.g., McGovern v. City of Minneapolis, 480 N.W.2d 121, 126-27 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 1992) (ordering summary judgment against
§ 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds, summary judgment against tort claims on
official immunity and discretionary function immunity grounds, but denying summary
judgment against state-constitution takings claim); see also Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd.
of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465 (1978) (invoking state constitutional recognition
of right to acquire property as a vehicle to challenge sex discrimination in promotions
where plaintiff's sex discrimination claim against private university under Title VII was
barred by administrative filing requirement, and state statutory discrimination claim
was barred by statutory exception for private universities).
69. See MINN. STAT. § 466.03 (1992); see also Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn.
1992) (adopting derivative official immunity doctrine protecting municipal entity); El-
wood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing official immunity).
70. Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 14 N.W.2d 400 (1944).
71. 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing state constitutional limitations on
involuntary psychotropic treatment at state hospitals).
72. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
73. 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 504 N.W.2d 198
(Minn. 1993).
74. Thiede, 217 Minn. at 231-32, 14 N.W.2d at 407-08.
75. Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 149-50.
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individual immunity and strict governmental liability."6 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals then completed the circle by an-
nouncing the State's "unquestionable" sovereign immunity to
damages liability for a state constitutional violation." These vari-
ations reflect the diversity of approaches other states have ap-
plied to questions of governmental and official immunity in state
constitutional litigation.
A. Minnesota's 180-Degree Turn.
The Thiede decision'" in 1944 is the high water mark for per-
sonal liability for constitutional violations in Minnesota. Perhaps
responding to the outrageous circumstances of the Thiede fam-
ily's eviction and banishment, 9 the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the officials involved should be fully liable for the re-
sulting damages.8 0 The court explained its decision by empha-
sizing the constitutional nature of the rights involved:
The officer's protection given to him by the law is a shield to
protect him against honest mistakes in judgment; it is not a
sword with which to strike down constitutional rights of citi-
zens. As in the case of illegal arrests, the officer is bound to
know these fundamental rights and privileges, and must keep
within the law at his peril. Our Constitution furnishes a guar-
anty against any encroachment by public officers or others
upon the basic rights which belong to every citizen as a mem-
ber of society.... The complaint must be held to state a cause
of action against the supervisors of the defendant town, irre-
spective of any allegations of wilfulness, wantonness, or mal-
ice. Such allegations are important only in determining their
liability for exemplary as opposed to compensatory
damages.
8 1
76. Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 42.
77. Mitchel4 487 N.W.2d at 905.
78. Thiede, 217 Minn. 218, 14 N.W.2d 400.
79. The Thiedes were forced from their own home and banished from their own
community for the sake of easing a city's welfare burden. 217 Minn. at 219-25, 14
N.W.2d at 402-05. On February 27, 1943, "with force and violence against the will and
over the objections" of the Thiedes, the entire family was evicted from their homestead
in Scandia Valley by the Morrison county sheriff. Id. at 223-24, 14 N.W.2d at 404-05.
The family and all of their personal property were removed to Fawn Lake Township in
Todd County, where they had lived before relocating to Scandia Valley. Id. at 220-24,
14 N.W.2d at 403-05.
80. Id. at 230, 14 N.W.2d at 407-08.
81. Id. 231, 14 N.W.2d at 408 (citations omitted).
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By contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved the "more
perplexing question" of municipal liability for the officer's acts
by concluding that the city was immune.8 2 The town of Scandia
Valley appears to have escaped liability on two grounds. First,
the court held that "in administering the poor laws, [city offi-
cials] act, not as agents of the town, but as officers of the state.""3
The plaintiffs may simply have sued the wrong principal. More
important, however, the court also embraced the legal fiction,
then prevalent, that held public officials performing governmen-
tal tasks are "agents or servants of the public at large, and the
[municipal] corporation is not responsible for their acts or omis-
sions nor for the acts or omissions of the subordinates appointed
by them." 4
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Jarvis v. Levine 5
is best known for the controversial procedural and substantive
restrictions the court placed on the involuntary administration
of certain medications and other intrusive treatment at state
mental hospitals.86 Few may remember that the Supreme Court
also addressed, in passing, whether the defendants involved
should be held liable for violations of the state constitutional
right to privacy upon which the decision was founded. Writing
for the court, Justice Yetka stated:
Insofar as the suit for damages in this case is concerned, we
agree with the decision of the trial court that there is no
cause of action. The parties involved followed the established
procedures outlined by the state in the handling of mental
institutions and are thus immune from liability.... [A]s to the
failure of respondents to obtain judicial review in the past,
prior to treating Jarvis, respondents are not liable for dam-
ages because they followed the statutory procedures which
were presumptively constitutional until today.
8 7
82. Thiede, 217 Minn. at 232-34, 14 N.W.2d at 408-09.
83. Id. at 234, 14 N.W.2d at 409.
84. Id., 14 N.W.2d at 409-10 (citation omitted).
85. 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
86. Id. at 145-48. See also Laurie K. Fett, Invoking the State Constitution to Invalidate
Legislation: Who's Guarding the Guardians, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1073, 1085 (1992);
Michael C. Krikava & Charlann E. Winking, The Right of an Indigent Criminal Defendant to
Proceed Pro Se on Appeal By Statute or Constitution, a Necessary Evil, 15 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 103, 104 n.2 (1989); Eric S.Janus, AIDS and the Law: Setting and Evaluating Threshold
Standards for Coercive Public Health Intervention, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 503, 527 n.135
(1988).
87. Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 149-50 (citations omitted).
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In Jarvis, the supreme court left unanswered whether the
plaintiffs would have encountered the same kind of Harlow-style
qualified immunity8 on a claim directly against the State of Min-
nesota itself for a violation of state constitutional rights. If the
court was serious about its analogy to Harlow, then this good-
faith immunity would not necessarily have protected a govern-
mental body from liability for damages, even in a test case.89
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently held in Pletan
v. Gaines" that a city is immune from tort liability if its agent is
immune.9" The same logic should apply with equal force to state
constitutional claims.
In Wegner, the property damage that resulted from the efforts
of Minneapolis police officers to arrest a barricaded fugitive in
the plaintiff's home led to strict municipal liability.92 No consid-
eration of traditional state tort law defenses, such as the immu-
nity enforced in Thiede,93 was apparent in the decision. At the
same time, however, the court concluded its analysis with the fol-
lowing: "As a final note, we hold that the individual police of-
ficers, who were acting in the public interest, cannot be held
personally liable. Instead, the citizens of the City should all bear
the cost of the benefit conferred."94
Perhaps the most troubling and controversial aspect of the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Wegner is the speed with
which it rejected the notion of a "public necessity"9" defense to
liability under Article I, Section 13.96 The court rejected the
city's assertion of a public necessity defense, not because it
found the damage inflicted by the officers to be unnecessary but
because the court deemed that "an individual in Wegner's posi-
tion should not be forced to bear the entire cost of a benefit
conferred on the community as a whole"97 by the apprehension
of a dangerous felon:
88. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
90. Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1992).
91. Id. at 43.
92. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1991).
93. Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 14 N.W.2d 400 (1944).
94. Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 42.
95. Id. at 40-42.
96. The Constitutional provision states: "Private property shall not be taken, de-
stroyed or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefor, first paid or
secured." MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
97. Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 42.
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Once a "taking" is found, compensation is required by opera-
tion of law.... At its most basic level, the issue is whether it is
fair to allocate the entire risk of loss to an innocent home-
owner for the good of the public. We do not believe the im-
position of such burden on the innocent citizens of this state
would square with the underlying principles of our system of
justice. Therefore, the City must reimburse Wegner for the
losses sustained.98
The logic of Wegner-if generalized to all possible defenses in
all state constitutional litigation in Minnesota-would essentially
deprive all governmental entities of any defense otherwise avail-
able in state tort litigation or in federal constitutional litigation.
If the question is really whether it is better for the public as a
whole or the individual plaintiff to bear the burden incurred,
the public entity will nearly always lose. Governments will nearly
always be in a better position than individual citizens to bear the
burden of injurious actions, even if such cost-shifting itself
causes governments to react by reducing their involvement in
activities of great public benefit.
The contrast between the logic applied in Wegne?9 9 and the
Minnesota Supreme Court's more recent reasoning in Pletan °°
could not be more striking. Acknowledging the doctrine of de-
rivative official immunity as a bar to municipal tort liability for
the parents of a child killed in a police chase, the court con-
ceded at the outset the need to "shield an officer's exercise of
independent judgment from civil adjudication." °1 The court
was satisfied that the goals of compensation and deterrence were
adequately served by the "ordinary" availability of auto insurance
coverage and the deterrence resulting from internal peer review
and public scrutiny. °2 The combined effect of the Wegner °3
and Pletan1° 4 decisions creates a truly bizarre result: parents of a
child killed in the chase are left without a remedy,10 5 but the
owner of a sign damaged at the conclusion of the same chase
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1992).
101. Id. at 42.
102. Id. at 42-43.
103. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
104. 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1992).
105. Id. at 44.
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may have an absolute constitutional right under Wegner to re-
cover the value of that property.
10 6
By resting the cost-shifting logic of the Wegner decision upon
"basic notions of fairness and justice,"'" 7 the Minnesota Supreme
Court may have left itself an out when confronted with future
cases in which the composition of the court is more sympathetic
to the governmental interests at stake. Indeed, by apparently re-
stricting the scope of either the constitutional right or the im-
plied remedy to instances in which the owner of the damaged
property was "innocent," 0 8 the Supreme Court may have sig-
naled an interest in considering and creating new defenses to
state constitutional liability if the court's own sense of "fairness
and justice" begins to tip against the plaintiff.
Only a few months after Wegner, the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals flashed a ray of hope for governmental entities that con-
strued Wegner as the creation of absolute governmental liability
for constitutional violations. In Mitchell v. Steffen,"°9 the district
court refused to award plaintiffs retroactive public assistance
benefits after a constitutional violation was found.110 The trial
court believed that the Commissioner "was immune from money
damages under the doctrine of sovereign immunity."1
Although the Court of Appeals disagreed with the characteriza-
tion of retroactive benefits as "money damages," it accepted the
district court's premise that sovereign immunity would preclude
plaintiffs who had prevailed under the United States and Minne-
sota Constitutions from recovering money damages.' 2 Indeed,
the appellate court held that money damages "would unques-
tionably be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity."' 13 As
to this issue, neither side asked the Minnesota Supreme Court to
review the Court of Appeals' decision. 4
At first glance, an assertion of absolute immunity from liability
for damages from state constitutional violations by cities and the
106. Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 42.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 504 N.W.2d 198
(Minn. 1993).
110. Id. at 904-05.
111. Id. at905.
112. Id. at 905-06.
113. Id. at 905.
114. Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198, 203 (Minn. 1993).
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state is difficult to square with the result in Wegner.115 The an-
swer may lie in the Mitchell appellate court's narrow conception
of money damages that a sovereign cannot be compelled to
pay. 16 Arguably, this characterization does not include compen-
sation for takings.
In deciding Mitchell the court of appeals refused to borrow
the seemingly analogous test used by federal courts to decide
whether an award of retroactive welfare benefits constituted
money damages or equitable relief. 17 Instead, the court asked
whether the action sought to enforce a mandate "which happens
to be one for the payment of money."1 " Because a takings
clause is properly viewed as a mandate to pay compensation, the
Wegner case may never have raised the question whether sover-
eign immunity would bar a claim for money damages under the
Minnesota Constitution.
The Court of Appeals' reliance upon sovereign immunity in
Mitchell flies in the face of the conventional wisdom that indi-
cates the Supreme Court abolished sovereign immunity of pub-
lic entities long ago.119 However, this seems to reflect a flaw in
the reasoning behind the conventional wisdom rather than a
flaw in the Mitchell decision. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
abolished sovereign immunity to tort claims but has not pur-
ported to abolish its applicability to other types of claims. For
115. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1991) (stating
that once a "taking" is found, compensation is required by law).
116. Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 905-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). Distin-
guishing between money damages and money claimed through specific relief, the court
stated: "Damages are given to the plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss, whereas spe-
cific remedies 'are not substitute remedies at all, but attempt to give the plaintiff the
very thing to which he was entitled.' Thus, while in many instances an award of money
is an award of damages, '[o]ccasionally a money award is also a specie remedy.' " Id. at
906 (quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 895 (1988)) (citation omitted).
117. Mitchel, 487 N.W.2d at 906 n.3. Indeed, the court of appeals' rejection of the
Eleventh Amendment analogy is essential to the result because retroactive welfare bene-
fits have long been considered a form of retrospective relief unavailable in federal
courts against a state under that Amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); Richter v. Bowen, 669 F. Supp. 275 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (holding that states are
protected under the Eleventh Amendment from suits in federal court for retrospective
relief such as awards for wrongfully withheld AFDC benefits). The Minnesota Court of
Appeals instead looked to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Mitchell 487
N.W.2d at 906 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988)).
118. Mitchel, 487 N.W.2d at 906 (quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 900
(1988)).
119. See Nieting v. Blondell, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Minn. 1975); Spanel v. Mounds
View Sch. Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (Minn. 1962) (prospectively abolishing
sovereign immunity to tort liability).
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example, in Spanel v. Mounds View School District No. 621,120 the
court held that "the defense of sovereign immunity will no
longer be available to school districts, municipal corporations,
and other subdivisions of government on whom immunity has
been conferred by judicial decision with respect to torts which are
committed after the adjournment of the next regular session of
the Minnesota Legislature. 1 21 While considering the sovereign
immunity of the State in 1975, the court merely held that "we
therefore abolish the tort immunity of the State of Minnesota with
respect to tort claims arising on or after August 1, 1976, subject to
any appropriate action taken by the legislature." 122 Because the
supreme court has never abolished sovereign immunity for other
kinds of claims, and has not purported to do so in Wegner or any
other decision, the state and its municipalities and school dis-
tricts should remain totally immune from liability for money
damages sought under nontort, noncontract theories. If this
reasoning is sound, the critical question in future cases will be
the parameters of the court of appeals' narrow definition of
"money damages" when applied in new contexts.
B. "Enclaves of Immunity" to State Constitutional Liability in Other
States
The cost-shifting rationale announced with little explanation
in the Wegner decision is virtually the same rule recommended by
Yale Law Professor Peter H. Schuck for all government liability
litigation.'2 Yet even Professor Schuck acknowledges the need
to create "enclaves of immunity" in order to encourage vigorous
decision making.124 Similarly, U.S. District Court Judge Harry
MacLaughlin has recognized the need to create exceptions to
the usual rule of municipal or county liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for final policymakers' decisions where the conduct in
question would otherwise be subject to judicial or quasi-judicial
immunity in an action against an individual defendant. 125 Even
120. 118 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn. 1962).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Nieting, 235 N.W.2d at 603 (emphasis added).
123. PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS,
111-12 (1983) ("When the collectivity seeks to fulfill benign aspirations but errs and
injures, as it often will, it must-like anyone else-repair its damage and compensate
its victims.")
124. Id. at 149.
125. In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1187 (D. Minn. 1987).
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if the Mitchell court's resurrection of sovereign immunity is short-
lived, and municipal liability for state constitutional violations
becomes the prevailing rule, the experiences of other states sug-
gest that Minnesota will recognize certain "enclaves of immu-
nity" that parallel highly valued immunities to liability under
state tort law and § 1983 liability.
Courts in other states have shown reluctance toward ex-
tending the scope of discretionary function immunity provisions
in state tort claims legislation to bar state constitutional liabil-
ity.126 Nevertheless, courts have shown a willingness to protect
discretionary functions from state constitutional liability for pol-
icy reasons. For example, in Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners
Association v. Town of Conway,'27 the plaintiff contended that the
municipal defendant's refusal to lay out a road to serve the plain-
tiff's land violated New Hampshire's equal protection and due
process clauses.128  Characterizing the decision of how and
where to lay out a road as a decision requiring the exercise of a
high degree of discretion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
held that such decisions must be immune from constitutionally
based suits to the same extent as they would be immune from a
tort suit.
129
The Michigan Court of Appeals has recognized a form of legis-
lative immunity that precludes recovery of damages against the
State of Michigan by a plaintiff who contended-successfully-
that the state's judicial compensation statute violated the equal
protection clause of the Michigan Constitution.130 The Michigan
Court of Appeals found that an award of damages in that setting
was "objectionable on the basis of the most basic notions of com-
mon-law legislative immunity. " "'
Courts have also recognized the need to protect municipalities
from liability in state constitutional lawsuits arising from judicial
or quasi-judicial decisions. For example, in Davis v. Everett,132 the
Alabama Supreme Court held that the city's denial of a liquor
126. See, e.g., Melbourne Corp. v. City of Chicago, 394 N.E.2d 1291 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (asserting that a constitutional tort is not subject to restrictions in Illinois Tort
Claims Act).
127. 503 A.2d 1385 (N.H. 1986).
128. Id. at 1389.
129. Id.
130. 77th Dist. Judge v. State, 438 N.W.2d 333, 337-38 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
131. Id. at 340.
132. Davis v. Everett, 443 So. 2d 1232 (Ala. 1983).
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license to an establishment less than 600 feet from a church vio-
lated the Alabama Constitution's equal protection guarantee,' 3
but denied plaintiff's request for attorney's fees.' 34 Using Ala-
bama common law as a defense to liability in a state constitu-
tional claim, the trial court held that "neither a municipality, its
mayor, nor the members of the board of commissioners are lia-
ble in damages on account of the exercise of their quasi-judicial
powers regarding approval or disapproval of an application for a
retail liquor license .. absent fraudulent, malicious, or corrupt
intent."'
3 5
IV. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES: THE MISSING CATALYST IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
One might wonder why the Minnesota Constitution is so
rarely used as an offensive weapon. In many situations, it is the
perfect end-run of the increasing conservatism of federal consti-
tutional jurisprudence, a federal bench dominated by conserva-
tive appointees, and the various immunities and defenses to
liability available under § 1983. The answer may lie in the ab-
sence of an express right to recover attorneys fees in a successful
suit under the Minnesota Constitution.
Many scholars have associated the explosion in § 1983 litiga-
tion since the mid-1970s136 with the enactment in 1976 of the
Civil Right Attorney's Fees Award Act, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988.117 Minnesota, like most other states, has not yet enacted
a statutory counterpart to § 1988 that expressly entitles plaintiffs
133. Id. at 1236.
134. Id. at 1238.
135. Id. at 1235.
136. During § 1983's first 69 years of existence (1871-1939), only 19 cases were re-
ported. Elena M. Albamonte & Peter B. Wheeler, Comment, The Supreme Court Corrals a
Runaway Section 1983, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1073, 1075 n.24 (1983). In 1960, only 280
cases were filed. Id. By 1971, however, the number of cases filed annually had risen to
4609. Id. (citation omitted). A 1980 government report further estimated that nearly
13,000 filings occurred annually in 1980. Id. (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR). See also Matthew V.
Hess, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L.
REv. 149, 153 n.28.
137. The dramatic increase in civil rights litigation over the past 15 years suggests to
at least one commentator that § 1988(b) is fulfilling its purpose. Hess, supra note 136
at 173 n.163. But cf., StewartJ. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional
Tort Litigation: The Influence of Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73
CORNELL L. RV. 719, 755-59 (1988) (suggesting attorney fees statutes may have less of
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in state constitutional litigation to recover their attorney fees if
successful.' 38 Thus, in the absence of a Minnesota equivalent to
§ 1988, plaintiffs seeking to enforce rights under the Minnesota
Constitution must face a tradeoff. While the Minnesota Consti-
tution may offer plaintiffs an interpretation of certain rights that
is more expansive than is currently available under the United
States Constitution, they must do so on their own "dime."
In her 1992 treatise on constitutional law, Professor Friesen
suggests a strategy, accepted by some courts, for getting the best
of both worlds-the expansive interpretation of rights available
under a state constitution and the attorney fees available under
§ 1988. Under her strategy, plaintiffs should simultaneously
seek relief for federal constitutional violations under § 1983 and
state constitutional violations in state court or as a pendent claim
in federal court. The plaintiff should then encourage the court
to follow "pre-existing state court precedent" so as to decide the
merits of the state constitutional question before addressing the
merits of the federal constitutional claim.'39 Assuming the plain-
tiff successfully persuades the court that his or her state constitu-
tional rights were violated, Professor Friesen contends that the
plaintiff should be treated as a "prevailing party" under § 1988
and therefore collect his or her attorney fees, just as if the plain-
tiff had prevailed under § 1983.140
Professor Friesen's strategy is creative and potentially success-
ful, but is difficult to square with the express terms of § 1988.
Section 1988 contains an exhaustive list of rights for which recov-
ery of attorney fees may be available, with no mention of state
constitutional claims. 4' Moreover, the clear focus of § 1988 is
on federal (rather than state) rights. In addition, the Minnesota
Supreme Court's approach to Mitchell last year demonstrated
that the "longstanding rules of judicial restraint" that en-
138. Contra Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 12, §§ l1-H,
11-I (1986) (allowing recovery of attorney fees in cases where Massachusetts Constitu-
tion was violated by threats, intimidation, or coercion); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(a)-
58 (1986) (allowing recovery of attorney fees for violation of certain rights under Con-
necticut Constitution). A few other states-including Utah, California, and Idaho-
have enacted legislation authorizing attorney fee awards but only in narrowly defined
situations. See FRIESEN, supra note 53, at 1 10.02.
139. FRIESEN, supra note 53, at 1 10.04.
140. Id. See also Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985) (award-
ing § 1988 fees when plaintiffs prevailed on state constitutional grounds in a combined
federal and state constitutional lawsuit).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
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couraged courts to decide state-law questions before reaching
federal constitutional questions are frequently disregarded by
judges hesitant to resolve cutting-edge issues of state constitu-
tional law. 14 2 A plaintiff with a strong state constitutional claim
who hopes to collect attorney's fees by tacking on a federal claim
is more likely to be taken through removal before a federal
court. Obviously, the federal court may have less interest in ex-
panding state constitutional rights than a state court. In such
cases the inclusion of the federal claim becomes a tactical blun-
der that, at a minimum, may result in delay due to a dismissal
without prejudice of the state claims for lack of supplemental
jurisdiction, and at worst may substantially increase the likeli-
hood of a defeat on the merits.
V. CONCLUSION
This article might well have been titled, "Who Needs Section
1983 Anyway?" Thus far, Minnesota courts have demonstrated
that the legislature's failure to enact any remedial scheme for
state constitutional litigation does nothing to limit or foreclose
the use of the Minnesota Constitution as a sword. Moreover, the
armor of qualified immunities that surround cities and their offi-
cials and protect them from other kinds of lawsuits suggests that
a claim under the Minnesota Constitution may be the preferred
vehicle under which to seek relief. Thus far, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has been able to address the remedial issues in-
volved in state constitutional litigation without either articulat-
ing an underlying theory or rationale of any weight or
attempting to reconcile the various approaches the court has
taken in the past to such questions. The court can continue on
this path for only so long before the resulting doctrinal disarray
makes a harmonizing decision inevitable.
142. Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198, 203 (Minn. 1993) (striking down statute
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